tbis morality in earlier cbapters of 7he 1964 Rome Leelure• Sartre discusses its hearing on socialist revolution in tbe final cbapter. entitled "Moratity of Praxis and Alienated Moralities. " This unpublished. rougbly written. and incomplete work is available for study at Paris' Bibliotb~ue Nationale. In the course of its four cbapters and 139 typescript pages. it applies Sartre's progressive-regressive metbod to moral phenomena. 100ugh we have discussed the first three cbapters elsewhere we will briefly review them below. 3 In Chapter Four, Sartre arrives at the moment of "progressive synthesis" in which he attempts "to grasp the moral problem as it is manifested to [tbe historico-ethical agent] through bis historical task and in the present conjunclure. ,,4 We cannot fully analyze this chapter here in its proper context of Sartre's criticisms of capitalism and bureaucratic socialism. We will introduce its basic concepts. summarize its contents, and briefly situate it in Sartre's oeuvre-suggesting its role in fulfilling his 1943 projection of an ethics-and finally. we will raise what we take to be pertinent questions for its evaluation.
Since for Sartre the dominant systems under which we live exploit and oppress humans, what he calls "the ethical problem" is to leam how a revolutionary "counter-system" can attain its goal of "humanity" while in the process surviving within those systems. Surviving will involve giving birth to "limited." even "alienated." moralities at various stages of struggle. But how. then. can the revolutionary force avoid degenerating into repeating the capitalist or bureaucratic socialist systems themselves? Such degeneration would 3See our "Dialectical Ethics: A First Look at Sartre's Unpublished 1964 Rome uClure HOles," Social Texl No. 13-14, Winter/Spring 1986, pp. 195-215 ; and allO our "'Making the Human' in Sartre's Unpublished Dialectical Ethics" in Writing the Polilics 01 Dlfference, ed. H. Silverman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 111-122. Eyewitnesses say Sartre eonsulted the entire large bundle of pages he brought to the podium-often tuming many pages at onee. News accounts confinn he touched on eentral points from eaeh of The 1964 Rome Leclure's four ehapters. These notes may have been drafted with a view to the lecture series he already planned to give in the U.S. at Comell University the following year. Thil series was not given due to Sartre's protest of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in Febroary, 1965, though indefinitely postpone "humanity," making the lalter a "pure ideal, pure regulative concept" instead of an ongoing unifier of struggle. "Socialist morality" (he also speaks of "revolutionary morality") is therefore characterized by a certain "contradiction," whicb it does not resolve. On the one band, it is the only morality determining itself in relation to the goal of "integral humanity." On the otber, it knowingly produces alienated moralities within itself in order to meet the needs of present struggle. Thus
The problem ia therefore lo leam how to produce that dialectical movement which, while poailing auch alienated moraliliel, can allO contelt their limill in relation to the very end which they aeek lo auain. (147/122) Sartre's solution to "the ethical problem" is, in a word, "morality." This designates in Chapter Four a practice of reflection and self-eriticism within the "revolutionary organization." A "socialist morality" that generales and controls alienated moralities in the course of struggle is possible because the future goal of "historical praxis" generally-"bumanity"-provides a present "role of efficacity." "Morality" for the revolutionary group, then, becomes in part the activity of ordering means in light of ends:
Introduction
The morality of revolutionary action arises for Sartre not from norms whose validity can be established independently of history, but from the iooer structure ofhistorical action itself. Sartre has described "praxis"-human action in its historical context-in his Criti1ue 0/ Dialeetical Reason Volume I. published in 1960, four years earlier. That work argued that praxis has a means-end structure. Along with other components of history, this structure evinces a dialectical rationality that allows history itself-understood as developing "totalization" of praxeis-to be at least "comprehended" and perhaps consciously made. 6 As we will see, 7he 1964 Rome Leeture builds directly on both volumes of the Critique,' advancing on them by bringing out the normative aspects of praxis. The paradigm case of praxis is productive work aimed at sustaining Iife. As the title of ehapter Four implies, there is a "morality of praxis." We will examine this morality in the context supplied by the three earlier chapters of 7he 1964 Rome Leeture. These were in turn developed on the bases of CDR 1 and 11. The spring or motive for historical action, Sartre repeats in 1964, is in need. The end or goal posited in need, however, is what he calls "humanity" (or, also, "autonomy"). The dialectical "birth" of "humanity" is a minor event as described in CDR. It Jonathan Ree (London: New Left Bookl, 1976), p. 247n. (Hereafter: "CDR 1..) 6Analysis of action wilhin history is, Sartre notes, inherently likely to yield "the instrument of thought by means of which Hiltory thinks it8elf insofar as tbey (tbe instruments by which Hiltory thinks itselfl Are also the practical instruments by means of which it i. made.· (CDR I, p. 40.) 7Sal1re may have had much of Volume 11 done when he published CDR I in 1960. He brießy resumed wort on Volume 11 in 1962, though the incomplete results were published only posthumoullyas Critique de la raison dialeclique, Tome 11 (inacheve): L 'inlelligibilile de I 'H; slo; re, ed. Arlette Elkaim-Sal1re (paris: Gallimard, 1985) ; English translation by Quintin Hoare, Critique o/Dialectical Reason, Volume /1 {U'lfinished}: 7he InlelligibUity o/H; slory (London: Verso, 1991) . This translation i. hereafter referred to a. ·CDR 11.· "Humanity" is a rich concept designating a multi-faceted entity. Humanity's root is in need. Need is not reducible to preference (as liberal economic theory would have it); ralber it posits a future satisfaction, and, thereby, continued Iife. A normative demand is already present, according to Sartre, who writes (believing he is quoting Man, though we cannot fmd it in Marx): "[need] carries within it its own reason for satisfaction." (97/77)8 The norm here, though teleological, is not utilitarian. The satisfaction aimed-at is not for Sartre a mere benefit to a humanity that is presumed to be already complete. What is posited by need is rather "integral humanity" itself. How is this to be attained or got at1 Such humanity, which is presently lacking (through some particular lack), does not come to "practical organisms" from without. The practieal organism's own capacity for productive action (if only that of picking a froit from a tree) is given, along with need itself, as the means of closing the gap opened by the need between present lack and future satisfaction. The practical organism's goal is thus "temporalized" by need in the form of the historical project of filling its lacks through its own action. It thereby aims literally to make itself. Need points, then, not just to satisfaction or restored wholeness but to "humanity" qua hußWls who are "their own product," hence, to wholeness restored by the action of the needy beings themselves.
The normative element in praxis-the "reason" for its satisfaction which need "carries with" itself-becomes evident when we focus on the prospective, future-oriented character of need. Initially praxis confronts a field from which what is needed is lacking; humanity does not yet exist. The oddity of human action is that in it an unknown future, not the past, precedes and conditions the present. In need the present is transcended in favor of a non-existent, possible, future satisfaction. All lacks and obstacles stem from this upsurge of the practical organism's original need: ifthere's no need, then there's no lacked object or obstacle 10 getting it. Similarly with all diversions, alienations, and failures of praxis: if there's no goal-oriented free project of transcending the present, then there's no diversion, alienation, or faHure of that project. But there can't be such an understanding or praxis unless it sometimes does and in principle can achieve its goal. Since need is an experience only of praetical organisms, the field containing lacks and obstacles can always in principle be Intese numbers refer lolhe manuscripl and typescript pages, respeelively, of the unpublished, untillcd tcxt whieh wc eall 1Jae 1964 Rome uc 'ure. transformed. Freed.om-which is presumed in any reorganization of the given field in light of a non-existent future-thereby underlies and makes possible all failure and unintended results. This field can be made into a source of means for filling the lack and overcoming obstacles, since lacks and obstacles can only be discovered as such by a heing that bas first posited both a possible future humanityand its own power to attain it. This means may in fact be lacking. And even after obstacles are transformed into tools the whole endeavor may faH. Dut tben we can say that humanity is present in and subtends its own failure. Need thus posits no impossible tasks, thougb along the way, the task may he diverted into producing the opposite of wbat was intended.
Sartre caUs tbis power of transformation "invention. " It is the capacity of practical organisms to use everything, including themselves, as means to the end of autonomous bumanity. In Morality and History Sartre characterizes invention as "the moment of morality in historical praxis." Yet we find it is only morality's "optimistic" side (our word) that enters the dialectic here. Morality's historicaUy invariant "form," Sartre says (without endorsing aU the Kantian overtones) is 'the sheer "unconditional possibility" of doing whatever act is morally required (though again, such acts may fail). Morality's "content"-the conduct required by tbis or that actual morality-changes historically. What is constant and typical of morality is therefore invention, that aspect of praxis activated inthe actual undertaking and unfolding of the morally required acl. Specifically moral action reminds us that ordinary historical action, with its moral moment, is conditioned but not determined by the past or the present. Due to invention, humanity as the goal of historical praxis is "unconditionally possible." In sum:
... the root of morality is in need, that is to say, in the animality of man. It is need which poses man as his own end, and praxis as domination of the universc by man 10 be effecled Ihrough worlc. (100/79'" Humanity, inasmuch as it is lacked, and inasmuch as its inventive praxis is the < basis for any other lack, and hence any value whatever, may be valued and 80ught in its own right. This is true even if human reality is presently Clrbe sexism of Sartrets use of "man" herc to refer to both sexes is moderated by the fact that in general he uscs "man" and the non-sexist tenn "humans" interchangeably in this reganl.
"alienated." Our capacity to autonomously be our own product is indirectly aimed at inasmuch as praxis is presently devoted first 10 maintaining, say, a system of profit or bureaucracy. Humanity-this capacity for autonomous selfproduction-is devoted first to repetitive reproduction of such systems. It is diverted from its proper goal, itself, to the extent humanity is sought as a mere by-product of such reproduction. This misdirection of a capacity doesn't entail loss of humanity as a goal, however, just its pursuit in alienated form. Even though historical praxis has in fact always been blocked and diverted from tbis goal, humanity, wbich has sustained this alienation, can aim at itself. Thus humanity can be made the direet novel aim of heretofore historically alienated praxis.
. -Others qua opposing classes, etc. are pitted against Others (including ourselves as "Others") in a milieu of scarcity, in existing conditions of praxis, according to Sartre. This circumstance has fragmented our history intothe plural and hierarchicized histories of classes, races, genders, and nations. In such a "serialized" milieu our attainment of humanity will be blocked. Our results will always be diverted from and unrecognizable to our intentions, with the consequent want of "autonomy. "This is an essential feature ofhumanity, whose keynote is consciousness of heing the authors of OUf acts and their results. Autonomous humanity is for Sartre-as for Aristotle-impossible in isolation from others. Rather it requires group praxis. Humanity is not a glorious, lost past to be recovered. We can see that humanity as sustained global group praxis can be a future goal of praxis without ever having occurred morethan sporadically and locally in the past. IO Thus humanity must be invented without IOSpeeificaUy, "humanity" initially ariles in the praxii of what in CDR I Sartre had called "the pledged group." This il the dialeetieal scquel to the "group-in-fusion." When the fusing group sueeeeds-at least inasmueh as the external threat that had unified it from without is temporarily miuing-it must hold itaelf together by ilSelj' againlt the centripelal inßuence of scarcity on ita members. The pledged group is the eooled-down group-in-fusion, poiaed between lhe danger of regressing into seriality or progres.ing with ita lask of aocial change. The pledged group is, he aays, "lhe origin of humanity ." Sal1re's quasi-teehnieal UIC of the tenn "humanity" originates at this point. The group's "interior objeetivity" is "materially objeetified" in, e.g., a written paet. This expresscs not Ihe group'. "being" but rather "the etemll, froun preaervltioß of ita ri3ing" IS 1 group. "We are all brothera" (sie) ean bc aaid by the pledged group'. membcn, Sll1rc claims, not beeausc they share. eommon "nature" that the pledge externalizes (for lhat would lieense ulto speak of pea. in a pod as "brothers"), but ralher "in so far a., following the ereative let of the plcdge, we are our own sons, our eommon ereation." Autonomy .a group aelf-produetion is thereby tcmporarily models. Under such. conditions of class struggle amidst scarcity-which are those of history to date-praxis first aims at reproducing a system instead of producing humanity. Instead of being its own product, humanity is an alienated by-product of a system.
Another way of characterizing the present alienation of praxis is to say that to date the "practico-inert"-the domain of worked matter inherited from the past that conditions all present conduct and thereby diverts it from its aim-has dominated praxis. 11 The practico-inert presently guides praxis rather than the reverse. Yet this very fact shows us that it need not guide praxis, the practicoinert being itself a product of praxis. Morality cannot be neutral here. Historical moralities are themselves for Sartre ·practico-inert.· This is the "pessimistic" side of morality, as it were. Moralities reside in things, especially tools of all kinds, for Sartre. There are dormant commands in ·worked matter" of all sorts tbat are activated when we re-use it. The domain of worked matter enshrines past actions and class interests in imperatives, values, etc, that weigh on and divert present action away from making the human. 12 Instead of heing the product of this giant past product, humans can he their own product; they can dominate, instead of being dominated by, the practico-inert (including rnoralities). Given the structure of historical praxis, then, the object of need-and hence the goal human history could have (should we choose to give it one)-is no lessthan "autonomous humanity." This goal is ourselves, attained. Oaths such as the Tennis Coult Oath of 1789 (and perhaps, we would add, the Declaration of Independence of 1776) codify the voluntary introduction of terror into the revolutionary group. "Humanity" thus seems to entail the mutual power that insurgent group members asselt over each other, at least so long as scarcity endures, a phenomenon Saltre caU. "fratemity-terror." (CDR I, . See also Sartre's analysis in CDR 11 ofthe Boisheviks as a pledged group (CDR ;;, pp. 152-153). Though it arises in a milieu of scarcity, the humanity of the pledged group cannot be sus,a;ned in such a milieu. To avoid sinking back into seriality requires (at least) solving the problem of production and introducing abundance, which Saltre considers possible.
llCDR I, pp. 67, 71, 318-320. I1nough this point is fully developed only in the writings of the mid-1960's on ethics, it is already present in CDR I, p. 249n. As Saltre makel clear in his work on Flaubelt, "worked matter" can also consist of ideas in literary texts, such that Flaubelt's possibilitiel as a writer Are limited and his projects Are divelted by the literary tools he inherited from his literary forebears. L 'Idiot de la familie: Gus,ave Flauberl de 1821 d 1857 (Vol. 111) (paris: Gallimard, 1972.) understood as the future global grouping of beings producing ourselves through meeting our needs by joint praxis upon the material world. 13
While such "humanity" (and "autonomy") is not yet "the future of humans" it could be, that is, it is an underlying and irrepressible possibility of our actual history. Humanity is precisely what would be possible if, instead of doggedly reproducing a system (be it of profit or bureaucratic hierarchy), we produced ourselves as human. Our present state of reproducing such systems, in the hope that doing so will make our humanity for os, Sartre designates as tbat ofthe "sous-homme," the "sub-man," which we will also render, with some discomfort, as "sub-humanity." The ongoing "praxis-process" (a process sustained by praxis)14 of capitalism and bureaucratic socialism, leaves some "favored" and others "unfavored"-Ianguage Sartre evidently prefers in The 1964 Rome Leeture to the language of classes. The favored in general are oppressors and the unfavored are the oppressed. The unfavored are compelled to reproduce the system by their raw need; the favored are compelled to reproduce it by their Winterest," Le. ,their dependence for their life on wthe thing" (system-produced profit, privilege, etc.)IS Both the favored and the unfavored l~e concept of ".utonomy" in The 1964 Rome Lec'ure il closely rel.ted to the concept of "lOvereignty" advanced by Sartre earlier in CDR I: "8y sovereignty, in efTect, 1 mean the absolute practical power of the dialectical organilm, that il 10 ..y, purely and limply ila praxii al a developing syntheaia of .ny given multiplicity in ita practical field, whether inanimate objeela, living things or men. This rearraßlement-inaofar al it i. perfonned by the organie individual-i. the atarting-point and milieu of aU action (whether IUcceuful or unlUcceuful). 1 ean it IOvereignty becausc il ia aimply freedom itaelf a. a project which tranacenda and unifiel the material circumstances which gave rise to it and becaulC the only way to deprive anyone of it ia 10 destroy the organism itself." (CDR I, p. S78). The alienation of lUch individualsovereignty in the personal power of Stalin-efTected, paradoxicaUy, in the very name of the power of the people-il traced in CDR n, wriUen aboul two yean before The 1964 Rome LeclUre. (Cf. esp. CDR 11, I. pp. 197-219. are products of the. system, both are tied in conflicting ways to the same false hope that reproducing the system will make them human, and both embed themselves ever deeper in their sub-humanity by faHing to attempt to "make the human" against the system. The only end possible for such "sub-humans" is "humanity, " that is, the permanent termination of their sub-humanity.
Humanity is the end-unknowable, but .ralpable al orientation-for a being that definel itself by praxis, that is, for the incomplete and alienated humans that we are. (1351112) "Humanity," then, entails: satisfaction of needs instead of scarcity; selfproduction. instead of alienation; novelty instead of repetition; group instead of serial action; and praxis guiding, instead of heing guided by, the practico-inert. Humanity is an objective possibility. This is to say it can be the goal of subhumans; it is an option, not a necessary outcome or even a probability. lOus humanity is already impiicit in historical praxis insofar as the latter is laken up by existing systems as a mere means to their reproduction. It demands to be its own direct goal, since as an end it is lacking, it is not; it is needed. This, then, is a hasty overview of the context ioto which Sartre introduces his "socialist moraiity" with its "role of efficacity."
Summary
How is socialist morality to help in attaining humanity? Concretely, how is humanity as the end of historical praxis to "control" the "alienated moralities" to which it gives birth as a means to itself? ehapter Four is devoted to answering this question.
For Sartre, humanity or autonomy, if it is not a mere ideal but an historical project, requires as a condition the classless world of communism in its profound sense. If parents are to cease giving birth to sub-humans, birth itself must be "humanized." This requires that practical agents first make a society where no economic stroctures produce humans, and no state or alienated morality inhibits "pure common decisions." (141/117) Production of its own collective life by needy humanity implies a "solidarity" in which "the entire human group, stroggling agaiost the division of labor, renders to integral humanity the entire product of its work." (143/118) For such global selfproduction, common ownership of the means of production is required.
Otherwise everyone's labor, including those who do own the means of production, aims at profit, bureaucracy or some other end alien to the producers themselves. Communism, understood as such common ownership of the means of production, is the undiverted end implicit in human need. In the second volume of bis Critique 0/ Dialeet;cal Reason, Sartre had examined how the project of attaining this end, because it bad been undertaken in the pre-eapitalist conditions of the former USSR while encircled by hostile capitalist powers, had been diverted into realizing its opposite in the form of Stalinism. 16 Under these conditions the socialist impulse itself brought about its own hellish derailment. But in 1964 Sartre is focussed on that original socialist project itself. This project, he insists, does not aim at a system. Its objective is instead "beyond all systems." (106/84) Socialism is rooted in need and aims at humanity. Socialism is not an end in itself but a movement, a means to the end of integral humanity. Communism is one feature of the end sought: humans who do not control the means of production cannot be their own product. 17 But communism, socialism, and all other movements are themselves mere means to (and components of)the goal, Le. of humanity.
To make the human, starting from within existing systems that suppress it, requires "organization and institutions. " (145/119) The goals of the socialist movement cannot be immediately attained through the spread of good feeling or 16Cf. espe CDR 11, p. 115-117. 17Sartrc two yeara earlier had morc amply deacribed aocialism-undentood as Ihe means to eommunism-as folIows: "For whal eharaeterizc. it fundamentally is neilher abundanee, nortbe total elimination of classc., nor working-cla.. IOverci,nty-even Ihough Ihese eharacteri.tiel are indispensable, at least al distant aima of tbe elaential transfonnation. It il tbe elimination of exploitation and of oppres.ion, or-in positive tenns-tbe eolleetive appropriation of Ihe means of produetion." (CDR 11, through spontaneous moral conversions ad serialim. 18 This is because historical praxis, aimed at autonomous, integral humanity, discovers itself inilially as blocked by persons with interests who benefit from the system and stand between one's need and its satisfaction. To unblock praxis so that humans may indeed be their own product therefore requires of sub-humans a "pure" or "revolutionary" praxis aimed at classless society. Such higher-order praxis is addressed not only to meeting needs within the system but to altering the system itself. This requires construction of what Sartre calls a ·counter-system· inthe midst of the system. Since it is unlikely, in particular, that the owners of productive machines will voluntarily hand them over to producers, "rigorous organizations" are needed in order to wrest them away from their present owners for service to integral humanity.19
Their needs unmet, oppressed and exploited persons will initially lash out "against all moralities." In fact though, Sartre contends, they reject the system in the name of a "fundamental moral demand which is at one with the organism's material demand to live. " And tbis demand is precisely "morality as unconditional and radical future." (144/119)20 But if "morality" in such a class-divided system is not to be itself a tool for integrating people into that system, it can only mean that eacb revolutionaryts means must meet a certain criterion supplied by the end of autonomous bunwrity. -Revolutionary moralityrequires first aiming at sucb hunwrity in the future, partially realizing it in the present througb revolutionary action, and judging all means by tbeir barmony or disharmony with all the otber elements of this undertaking. Sartre articulates this solution to -the ethical problem-in the course of four numbered sections (three of which have titles) 'that form tbe body of the chapter. Eacb treats an example of the birth and control of alienated, -Iimited moralities. -These moralities correspond rougbly to the following four stages of transformation of tbe status quo: (1) The initial revolutionary impulse may be to restore a known if alienated past rather than undertake tbe risks of creating a novel future. (2) As the insurrectional phase mobiIizes, the organizational apparatus may eitber be foolishly sacrificed for pure ends or made an end in itself, thereby falling ioto either a self-defeating leftism, or a maintenance of tbe apparatus tbat substitutes for revolutionary praxis. (3) As iosurrection advances, terror, if it is necessary, risks becoming an ideology or even a system of govemance, especially if counter-revolutionary forces are strong. (4) Finally, as local obstacles are overcome, the revolution risks universalizing itself as a particular incamation of socialism, imposing itself elsewhere and thereby distorting otber struggles, as weil as itself. These four Iimited moralities entail risks to the socialist task that emanate from that task itself. Yet Sartre claims that all the ways to control these risks also emaoate from that same task, tbus bolding out tbe possibility of correcting revolutionary means in light of revolutionary ends. In each case Sartre seeks to show how these risky -limited moralities-arise as useful, even unavoidable tools of change, bow tbey proceed to endanger their goal of integral bumanity, and how they may nevertheless still be controlled by -morality-precisely in light of that goal.
Letts then review Sartrets four examples of sucb moralities. humans to things. In France after 1789 this class sought to add political power to its already-established economic power. It conceived its affmity for property as "natural," a propensity inherent in all humans 'that merely awaited uncovering (or re-institution) by political action-as against the "unnatural" hierarchy of the landed aristocracy. It invoked Greek and Roman iconograpby. At first coinciding with tbe liberation of large sectors of the masses, this past-oriented ethic became "particularized" by the favor capitalism awards capital interests. Meanwhile, made sub-human by the new system, propertyless workers actually have no "interests," only needs. "Socialist praxis" is stimulated by lack of both political and economic power on the part of those "unfavored" by capitalism. Yet such praxis aims at neither, according to Sartre, seeking instead "the simple naked power of the exploited to be human, whatever their real power in the produetive forces might be. " (149/124) The object of their need is humanity, a pure future that does not already exist. The very possibility of grasping this power can incite a fear of freedom and noveIty. Thus: "praxis, inside a present-past system, ;S afraid of being pure future. Against the system, it must constitute a pasl." (150/124) Though genuinely opposing the status quo, revolutionary morality may thus initially reinstate an alienated but familiar pasl. To illustrate, Sartre points to the early stages of the Aigerian Revolution. After nearly one hundred years of French occupation, the first impulse of insurgents in the mid-1950's was to restore a lost sovereignty. This was partly symbolized by bringing back the chador or veil for women, with all the subordination implied. But since this earlier state of freedom from colonial role was itself alienated, restoring that past could not yield liberation. Integration ioto the present is equally impossible, dominated as it is by what Sartre aptly calls "the club of man," i.e., the exclusive culture of the colonizer. Blocked against flight into the past, or integration into the present, no alternative is left Aigerians besides plunging into the future and "inventing humanity" through independence.
A "realistic" revolutionary will not tear the chador off but will oppose it while constantly re-directing attention to this difficult task of invention without models. In this way, the alienated morality of restoring a lost sovereignty need not deviate the revolutionary movement's pursuit of the "pure future," since that morality can be "limited" by consideration of that end and re-directed toward it. 21
2) "Moral ;nsu"ect;onal ach;evement" (Sartre's title). Dominance by "the system" over praxis continues only so long as tbe masses are serialized and hence impotent. To resist effectively, "a practical union against the system" in favor of a "non-existent moral society" is required. (152/126) However, effectively opposing the system injects imperatives into the insurgent union that come from the system ilself. System-generated repression exists, and this fact renders instantaneous pure group praxis impossible. To oppose the system's negation requires a "counter-system": a "revolutionary organization" or "party" or "organism" or "apparatus" that helps individuals avoid intemalizing repression and tums such negation back upon its tnae source. 22 Such a "provisional means" points radically beyond the present, but must meanwhile also operate within it. In describingthe problems facins the organization, Sartre subtly but scathingly criticizes the Communist Parties represented in his audience, and offers a corrective.
·Praxis requires" maintaining the revolutionary organization in readiness for the insurrectional moment, according to Sartre. Yet, since party functionaries' "mterest" is in their jobs, they can confusethis requirement of praxis with the permanent availability of the party w;th;n the existing system. Thus confounding their own system-generated interests with the norm of pure future, these functionaries may measure members' devotion to revolution by the unconditionality of their faith in tbe apparatus. When 'this happens "the end [that is, liberatory revolution] becomes tbe means of the means." (153/127) Revolution-taUe then serves to cover up the assimilation of revolutionaries into existing structures of power.
21Sartre bad no illulionaabout the actual reaulta of the revolutionary movemcnt for independence in Algena bctween 1956 and 1961. In an carlief ehapter of 7Ite 1964 Rome Lec.ure, he aaid that thil revolution had aucccedcd not in uahering in an effcctive aocialilm but ooly in moving from de jure atatutory colony to de fac.o cconomic colony, a modelt but real progreaa withal. Avoiding tbis alienation requires constant practice of cr;l;c;sm at the revolutionary group's base, criticism capable of changing leadership. Humanity makes itself "reflexively, " Sartre says, by critical "axiological" reflection on the action by which it produces itself. This means retlecting not just on alienated products, but on one's own actions that produced them. Democratic centralism-requiring defeated minorities within the apparatus to portray the majority position as their own all along-is to be avoided. "The problem," Sartre says, "is to give to the masses the possibility of dissolving the heing [I'elre] of the leaders.... " such that "the masses surpass their oWD leaders." (154/127) The apparalos seeks not to wield existing levels of political and economic power; it seeks rather to prepare the masses within the system to produce "integral bumanity." It does so by providing "the framework in which, by dissolving limited moralities, the masses leam bumanity as unconditional demand." (154/127) Yet this "apparatus," composed as it is of those experienced in struggle, is itself needed. Wildcat strikes outside the apparatus mayaiso posit humanity; however, "because [such strikes] do not discriminate between immediate and distant objectives, they vanish without traces whether won or lost." (154/128) Similarly, a revolutionary strike, when an unfavorable balance of force risks failure and breakup of the apparatus, should be stoppe(1. The apparalos, by linking immediate with distant objectives, provides both a "consolidation of progress" and a "synthetic memory" of mass stroggles.
There is a "dialectical tension" within the revolutionary project between conserving the organization as means and realizing humanity as its end. This tension is healthy. Its component tendencies are "opportunism" and "Ieftism" in Sartre's appellation. Opportunism is "conserving the means while changing~he end." "Leftism" is "Ietting the means perish rather than not affirm the unconditional end." Each needs the other as corrective. Opportunism and leftism, or at least tendencies loward them, are in fact bOlh necessary "for moral praxis." (155/129) Moral praxis is the linking of (opportunism's focus on) immediate efficaciousness to (leftism's focus on) the ultimate end. 23 Only 23Under this robric, we should label Hugo and Hoederer, the main protagonis18 of Sartre'l play Dirty Rands (1948), es leftilt end opportunist, relpectively. Hugo and hil sponSOR ere willing to risk fatally injuring the epperatus in order to keep revolutionary action pure end untainted by compromise with clasa enemiea. Hoederer is willing to make such compromisea in the present in through such linking is revolution possible. Sartre holdsthat non-revolutionary reforDlS, however deep, that are aimed opportunistically at preserving the present system, will yield only illusory progress since "it is impossible for humanity to be bom if sub-humanity [merely] advances on its suh-humanity. Humanity can only be bom from humanity." (155/129) Even as sub-humans posit humanity in resisting their condition, they risk heing made sub-human again by their own apparatus of struggle, if it treats them as passive means. "This would be to alienate man to the future just as the system alienates him to the past." (155/130) If individual revolutionary action is not to be stolen from its initiator, or its import lost by isolation from the instrument for registering collective progress, then there must be a democratic process within the revolutionary organization. Revolutionaries may not fully transcend their "sub-human" status through such a process hut they will "incamate the humanity [they] realize," even if that incamation is necessarily "abstract" in relation to general liberation.
When such an organization functions properly, moral praxis will have a "normative" but not an "imperative" aspect. A leader's command is normative if it emanates from the shared goal of realizing the form of norms, which is the "unconditional possibility of integral humanity. opportunism and leftism, erring in the direction of an opportunism that made the apparatus an end in itself.
In an uncanny anticipation of the "revolution of 1989," Sartre concludes tbis second sub-section on the revolutionary apparatus by noting optimistically that while praxis will always tend to "crystallize" into a system, one musl also know that this cryataUization cannot lose humanit)' forever, for humanit)' ia itself the real blsis of this limitation upon it, Ind from Ibis viewpoint, it will certainl)' contest its new .ub-humanit)'.s IOOn la thi. is po 3) "The Necessity 0/ Praxis" (Sartre's titte). The tie Iinking immediate objectives and long-term goals is stretched most during the "night-time moments" of making the human when the revolutionary leadership must engage in terror and Iying. By "necessity" Sartre intends the reduction of possibilities to one. When action has such "inflexible rigor," he asks, doesn't it exclude the unconditional end? If there's but one way to humanity and it involves means incompatible with a human world, isn't action with humanity as its end impossible? Sartre's answer is no. Humanity as end can still turn back on the means and "contra." them.
He does not envision using humanity as a means. Terror is characterized as action in which "sub-humans become the means of humanity." (159/133) Such action "born of the masses" is inherentty defensive, being "forced by the adversary." Terror not only re-introduces imperative orders, it accompanies them with "sanctions. " Sartre names no sanctions, but he alludes to "the violent liquidation of private interests and of old classes" (161/135) and to the Russian, Cuban, and Algerian revolutions. Paradoxically, "one maintains these sanctions in order to suppress them." (159/133) The original situation facing the practical organism is for Sartre one of workaday violence. Sartre is ambiguous as to whether he is talking of bureaucratic socialism or capitalism. "The system" in either case makes all its participants sub-human by its unimpeded, normal selection of its victims a prior; for misery or death, based on their class, race, gender or other irrelevancy. In its original instance terror is for Sartre a counter-violence in which one uses oneself qua sub-human as a means to one's own humanity beyond the system. In Moraliry and Hislory he analyzes cases of revolutionary militants who, under systematic torture by the Nazis (and tbe French), nevertheless conceal their absent comrades by making their pain-racked bodies, indeed tbeir very lives, the "absolute" means to the end of silence. Humanityas unconditional end is present in such cases. Among those who use tbeir sub-humanity in this way there is "solidarity. " This is neither a merging of persons nor their assimilation into a higher-order personality. Rather, due to their common aim, the seriality and alienation of hierarchical society are just dropped. In short, the human collectivity partly makes tbe human in aiming together at the "pure future." lnsofar as this effort entails resistance to a violent system (a reluctance that is always itself defmed as "violent" by the dominant system), the revolutionary group-if it is to resist at all, much less succeed-must to some degree engage in violence. Sartre noles:
Kant is wrong. Even in the city of ends man will be both ends Ind melns It the same time. The ideal moment of Ihe means, il aimply when humana will themselvellueh in light of the end, end as such the end incamatea itsclf in them in the moment in which they will themselvelas means (solidlrity). (159/133) The revolutionary group tben primarily uses itself collectively as its own means. May it use other sub-humans outside the group as means'? Sartre does not seem to exclude this and it seems to us hannonious with bis overall position, assuming the validity of revolutionary action in the first place. He proceeds to discuss the four conditions under which alone terror, Iying, etc.-in general, using sub-humans, through imperatives witb sanctions, to create humans-really might count as "inevitable" and therefore permissible. If any of these conditions cannot be met, we read Sartre as saying, tben terror is not permissible and other alternatives must be invented. The conditions are:
(1) Only when terror can be restrained from becoming a "system" like that of the adversary.
But the terrorist's ItNggle must be pursued 1I I provilional expedient. It ia Ihe Idversary who forcel him to make humanl the pure Ind limple means to humanity. The terrorilt mUlt in thlt elae aense the Other in himaelf (IS the Other denied but eonserved 1I thrclt) in produeing Ind maintainina Terror 1I I sYltem. (159/134) Provisional and defensive terror is necessary (Le., the only alternative), we interpret Sartre as saying here, only when it can be kept from becoming a system. It would seem that treating humans as means only (without also treating them as ends) can 't be restrained from becoming a system. If using terror in a given case would tend to use humanity as a means only, then that use would not be permissible.
(2) Qnly if those who exercise terror can and do avoid "ideologies" of terror. An example is Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country." This slogan was used to rationalize re-instituting sub-humanity precisely among those struggling against it. 24 (3) Only if no justification of terror is offered beyond its necessity. If one does not struggle against terror while applying it one maintains sub-humans in their sub-humanity. Thus one must: strictly limit its exercise; present it as inhuman to those who undergo it; never use it as the easiest solution; and never in order to cover amistake.
(4) Only if terror originales in the masses and is "assumed [by] the leaders in their turn." (160/134) But it must be assumed as "unjustifiable" and in the name of alle If terror is thus grounded in what Sartre calls "fraternity-terror," rather than in some claim to legitimate power, then it can give way to fratemity .2S n CDR 11 Sartre had analyzed Ihree aspeetl of terror in Ihe USSR of Ihe ]930'8: the "fabrieating" of a working eiasl out of peasanta in order to indultrialize rapidly; the forced eoUeetivization of agrieulture; and the reverberation of terror within the bureaueraey whieh "must be al one" (see elp. pp. 176-179). AI a requirement of praxil luch terror mlgh, still have been abandoned, onee itl tasie of unifyin, the Itnl"le had been aeeomplished, but for the institutionalization of ideologiealilogani lilee "aocialilm in one eountry." (CDR 11, p. 164).Thil eoneeptual "monltrolity," whieh Iplit the Soviet proletariat from the other proletariata it needed, had initiaUy been invented to defeat Trotsleyi8t universalism. But it then went on to help eodify in ltate power the hierarchieization of both the bureaueraey and the proletariat, two eontemporaneoul developments whose legitimation aetually made aocialilm less likely. (CDR 11, pp. 103-101) Cf. Aronson, Sartre 's Second Crilique, pp. 102-113. 2510 CDR I terror had been pOl1rayed as a given stnleture of the system, an inevitable strueture of resistanee to it, and a taeit source of unity within the insurgent movement. Terror wilhin the revolutionary movement ia "fratemity-terror." (See note 10 above.) Thil refen to the ltanding link between memben of the "pledged group." The anteeedent birth (in Sattre'l dialeetie) of revolutionary militants as "common individuali" <an individual whose praxil ia common) gives to , Maya Nazi torturer in occupied France be assassinated even if one knows doing so will result in the retributive murder of several arbitrarily selected fellow citizens? The example is OUfS. It seems to us that if the resulting retribution held the real prospect of awakening large numbers of one's fellow citizens to the need for solidarity and resistance, then the assassination, itself an indirect use of sub-humanity in one's victims and fellow citizens, might meet Sartre's four requirements (to the third of which he in fact appended a few more). Terror, Sartre holds, is "always a revolutionary pause" which "marks history negatively." Yet, if these four conditions are met, "Terror becomes revolulionary juslice. In short, the humanization of terror is possible in principle. "
. This passage scems again in some ways to anticipate the uprisings in Eastem Europe and the Soviet Union, initiated against the remnants of Stalin's system of terror-in the midst of its attempts to reform itself. 27 4) "!ncarnat;on" (Sartre's title) The sub-section with this tille deals with issues of defending soeialist gains, in particular the thomy question of the relation of revolutionary parties and groups outside the Soviet Union to the Soviet Union. Yet Sartre's dialectic of means and ends seems also to pertain to any new attempts to make the human.
Communism is the suppression of all Iystems. The praetieo-inel1 appears in it only to be dissolved. But socialiam il Itill a system. The praetico-inert exists in a socialist society. More to the point: luch a society realizel itaelf as a eel1ain individuality (traditions, historieal circumltanees).... The neeessity ofhistory is that the universal is never realized in it exeept in the form of singularity. This is what I
Sartre speaks of defense of the Soviet Union and other attempts to build socialism as an "obligation." Yet he counter-balances this obligation with the cognate obligation to surmount the particularity both of these struggles elsewhere and of one's own loeal apparatus of struggle. No single nation embodies the universal, no organizational entity is the "home" of socialism itself, so long as capitalism endures.
How, then, does Sartre propose to effect this delicate balance of perhaps conflicting "obligations" within the movement of universalization? By "ethics."
Ethics here is the "surpassing" of singularity, not its mere "negation. " Particular 28Cf. CDR 11, p. 22 for a general characterization ofthis idea, which is refractory to any attempt to eompare an ideal socialism with a ease of it. Thus Marxism is for good or ill "incarceraled by beeoming anational and popular eulture" in the USSR. In this ineamation Marxism both changes the "hastily-ereated" Soviet working class and is changed by it. (CDR 11, p. 109) Aronson in Sartre's Second Crilique remarks "Sal1re's analysis does show a eorruption of Marxism in its inearnation." (p. 183) socialist attainments are to be neither imitated nor negated, but built upon. To achieve the emancipation of workers it is not enough to blindly pursue it; "the clear representation of the essential end" of that emancipation is also required. This calls for creation of "an ethics of history. or to identify history witb tbe dramatic overdevelopment of morality. " (162/137) In these four ways, then, the "morality of praxis" botb gives rise to "alienated moralities" as temporary means to human liberation and also limits these moralities in the light of this same end, such that they are useful without freezing into permanent and oppressive ends in themselves. Ultimately it is hoped tbat group praxis becomes its own end and that need, instead of impelling os to re-ereate a system, becomes a mere occasion forthe inherently worthwbile collective problem-solving that beats back the practico-inert. Morality, as tbe practice of criticism within tbe expanding revolutionary group, mediates the slow triumph of bumanity over sub-bumanity. Tbe task is complex. Revolutionaries are in tbe contradictory position both of creating a system to combat a system and yet affirming the preeminence of humanity over all its systems. Tbey must therefore struggle against botb tbe system and the counter-system, even as they use the latter.
There is a risk that stroggling against the revolutionary system will destroy the revolutionary force itseif. This risk must be run, Sartre affirms. This is because "the blind reinforcement of the [revolutionary] system risks subjecting humanity to an alienation not of exploitation but of oppression." (164/139) Revolutionaries must hold firm to the norm of "unconditional bumanity" in opposition both to tbe system's imperatives and to those which struggle imposes on tbem. The latter imperatives are to be respected as provisional but not definitive in light of "autonomy of praxis" as the goal. It may even happen that the revolutionary force itself must be sacrificed, yielded up, if "blind reinforcement of the [revolutionary] system" would sink sub-humans even more deeply ioto their sub-bumanity, instead of advancing in tbeir humanity. Clearly Sartre is willing for this sacrifice to be made since sub-humanity in all its forms, wbether imposed by the system or the counter-system, is itself a limitation on or diversion of our underlying bumanity. This fact allows for hope, despite the most grievous alienation, that humanity will "find itself again" due to the "irrepressible" future, the autonomy of praxis that is pointed to by sheer human need.
Situating Chapter Four
Simone de Beauvoir, upon re-reading The 1964 Rome Leeture in 1986, called it "the culminating point of Sartre's ethics. ,,29 We find this phrase apt. It suggests a buildup including earHer attempts, subsequent efforts that do not attain its level, and perhaps overall failure to reach its goal-all of which seems to us to be true of tbis work. Wbat Sartre designated as "the problem of ethics" he never solved to his satisfaction (or to OUrs-BS we explain briefly below). He planned but never pubHshed a work on ethics. He made three attempts at it: one in 1947-1950 as a practical sequel to bis ontology of freedom in Being anti Nothingn.ess-an assault abandoned in the preparatory stages; another in 1964-1965 BS a practical sequel to bis analysis of the components of historical action in Critique 0/Dialeetical Reason-a MOre successful effort that reached a high level and which he always hoped to complete 30 ; and finally, in discussions with a young associate shortly before he died, he announced a plan in 1980 for yet another assault-in whose stated terms we find Httle advance over the two works of the mid-1960's.31
Wbile ehapter Four's "socialist morality" derives directly from the study of historical action in the Critique, it also draws together humanist themes of the 1940's. It recalls one of Sartre's few "positive" plays in which socialist values are ringingly affinned amidst rigorous struggle against oppression, namely 1he Victors (1946) .32 It also calls to mind his critique of official Marxism's deterministic materialism in " Materialism and Revolution" (1946) . In that essay he had insisted that it is precisely in regard to workers' transcendence of Jhe given in favor of a future (albeit their bosses, future)-in a word, their freedom-that they can be said to be oppressed. Oppression could not be imposed on them if they really were, as the then-dominant Marxism said, bits of extemally determined matter. 33 And finally, it calls to mind the writer's task-outlined in What is Literature? (1947)-of -representing-the end of proletarian struggle as freedom, thereby facilitating the -inventing-of -man,-with socialism as the -last means-to do it. According to that task, any means of attaining freedom and humanity whose use would -qualitatively-change that end must be avoided. 34 Yet in its suggestions for controlling revolutionary violence so as to avoid a system of terror, Chapter Four recalls most not any work of Sartre's but rather Simone de Beauvoir's lengthy discussion of the permissibility of violence in her 1947 work The Ethics 0/ Ambiguity. Existentialist ethics, especially as developed by Sartre and Beauvoir up to about 1950, was forged in part to deal with moral problems imposed on those who had elected to resist the Nazis' military occupation of France from 1940 to 1944. May one kill a 16-year-old Nazi combattant who is mystified and misled, if the urgency of armed struggle for freedom precludes re-educating him? May one violently oppose an anti-eolonial revolt against one's ally, Britain, if the revolt's leaders reject postponement and if prosecuting it now would derail the wider struggle against fascism? What should one do with a stool-pigeon discovered in the resistance network? Maya resistance militant eliminate three Nazi officers if he knows an entire French village will be bumed in retribution?
Such questions-which have no obvious answers-seem out of place in the USA 33when bosses accuse worken of -80rdid materialism-official Marxista often defend them by abandoning their own materialism, Sartre had noted, and thereby inconsistently ·give one to understand that behind these malerial demand. there wa. the affirmation of a humanism, that these worken were not only demandinga few more sous, but that their demand wa. a kind of concrete symbol of their demand to be men. Men; that is, freedoßll in pos8Cssion of their own destiniea. , 1950) , pp. 213-14, 211. ·We must, in al1 domains, both reject IOlutioDl which Ire not rigorously inspired by socialist principles and, at the same time, aland ofT from 111 doctrinea and movementa which consider aocialilm as the absolute end. In our eyea it ahould not repreaent the final end, but rather the end of Ihe beginning, or, if one prefen, the lalt means before the end which is to pul the human person in possession of his freedom.· p. 206. of 1992, a country .which is not only comfortable, but which has never suffered military occupation by a victorious enemy. In the course of treating such questions in her Cha~ter Three, Beauvoir evolves some guidelines for ·vigilant· pursuit of freedom. S Terror must be used only to avoid a greater evil, only as a last resort, only as a temporary expedient, and never as an institution, as in the case of Stalinism. Setting down in greater detail ideas Sartre was to return to less compellingly seventeen years later, she pointed upthe dialectical relation of means and ends in the ethics of revolution by remarking that . . . an action which wants to &erve man ought to be careful not to forget him on the wayj if it ChOO&e8 to fulfill itaelf blindly, it will lose its meaning or take on an unforeseen meaning; for the goal i. not fixed once and for all; it i. defined along the road which leads to it. Vigilance Ilone can keep alive the validity ofthe goals and the genuine assertion of freedom. 36 What, then, is the relation of the socialist morality of 1964 to the existential ethics that Sartre had himself projected in 1943 in Being and NOlhingness? We suggest, though we cannot make out the argument in detail here,that the socialist morality lays out certain elements of this projected ethics in Ihe form of an hislorical/praetical projeet.
Having devoted most of Being and Nothingness to describing the "ambiguous" structures of human reality, particularly its "serious" attitude of presenting itself "as a consequence, " Sartre had promised at the end of that work an ethical treatise that would describe the "special type of being" characteristic of humans at play.37The serious attitude of taking bread as desirable because ;1 is nourishing is a pursuit of being that is in bad faith because it "hides from 3S The E'hics 01Ambigui", trans. Bemard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), pp. 98-99, 149-150 . One ofthe many dilemmas explored in Sartre's The Vic'ors ia: while in cu.tody awaiting torture may one kill a Resistance comrade before he 's tortured if he professe. his inability to conceal (and willingness to revell) large &ectors of the network in order to ave his life and sanity? [itself] the free project whieh is this pursuit. -J8 Tbis attitude wrongly "asserts the priority of the object over the subject. ,,39 But if this attitude is morally deficient. as Sartre implies, must it not be because it is possible to reverse tbis priority and make the subject-the' human itself-the object pursued? Desiring to found its own contingent existence through its self-eonsciousness. human reality originally takes as its ideal the type of being that 000 has 40 -an impossible ideal whose dogged pursuit makes humanity a "useless passion. ,,41 Within tbis original or given project (wbieh need not be one's fundamental project) human reality can make itself its own objective, Sartre has already held in Being and Nothingness, and thereby at least "put an end to the reign of this value [of being 000]. ,,42 But when human reality effects such a "conversion." what'else can it become if not the historical project of making the human. as described in The 1964 Rome Leeture1 In "living" freedomts ehoice of itself as its new ideal. Sartre had suggested in 1943, freedom will "situate" itself as "conditioned" in order to assume "its responsibility as an existent by wbom the world comes into being...43 Isn't this precisely the responsibility for a human world that is experienced in historieal terms by the revolutionary as described in 19641
Yet we besitate to say 1he 1964 Rome Leeture is the projected ethics. Sartre is proposing here more a eertain undertaking than he is an ethies in the sense of a principle for realizing moral values through individual conduet. as is proposed. say. by Kant or Mill. Such prineiples presume it is possible to be moral in class society without having the overthrow of that society as one's first priority. As we will see shortly. Sartre repeatedly rejects this assumption. In the   3IBN "socialist ethics" the "demand" for "humanity" implicit in need constitutes an "exigency" that might better be called pre-moral or prolo-moral. The object of this exigency can itself become the objective of moral striving; moreover. it must be if anY other moral value is to be capable of realization. Freedom. like humanity, is what might be called a threshold value inasmuch as its universal realization is a condition for the authentie realization by an individual of any value whatsoever. To be moral. indeed to realize any value, one must first be free, since only free conduet can be ealled morally right or wrong. As Linda A. Bell rightly notes, tbis means freedom is willed implicitly as means in willing any value whatever as end. 44 But then such eollective liberation seems aimed not so much at satisfying some partieular morality as at making moralities in general possible in the first place by realizing humanity. In terms of socialist morality, action aimed at satisfying this or that historically dominant moral imperative, value. or ideal, is parasitie upon, rides piggy-back on, the power of invention in ordinary historieal praxis. But if being moral is impossible due to alienation by class society of this very power in praxis, there seems to be a morally prior task of making morality itself possible. Because the practico-inert always haunts praxis. this task has its own inner moral structure, and this is what is described in Chapter Four.
Evaluating Chapter Four
One strength of Sartre's aeeount is that it avoidsthe dangers of a eertain metaphor often used in thinking about revolutionary ends and means. A familiar, perhaps dominant. way of posing the issue of the morality of revolution goes as folIows: Does the end of revolution. the better state of humanity sought as its goal.justify or outweigh the violent. perhaps immoral. acts undertaken as means necessary to attain that end? If a means is indeed immoral then. it may. be argued. it can " be outweighed by good ends, but in that case there is 00 point in asking the question whether it can (unless it is simply to evoke a prejudice against revolutionary change). The question in any case presumes that revolutionary means ean be conceived as external to, and then weighed morally on the opposite side of the scale from, the revolutionary ends toward which they 44Cf. Linda A. Bell's diacussion ofthis in Sartre's Elhics 01AUlhenticity (fuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989), pp. 55-57. aim. But this also reveals a prejudice in the question. For, since ends are precisely the sorts of things that give point and intelligibility to means in the first place (if anything does), once one diseogages any means from its end, such that it can be weighed morally aga;nsl its end, it will already certainly appear at least pointless and will more likely be laken as morally wrong. The burden of proof-due to the conceptual prejudices buHt into the "scale" metaphor itself-is thus made unduly heavy for the revolutionary.
Sartre offers an alternative to the scale metaphor that allows us to disinterestedlyappreciate the moral problems of revolution. The scale metaphor treats acts as means and ends as something beyond acts. But means and ends, instead of being morally separable and weighable, are held by Sartre to be interconnected "moments" of actual historical undertakings. Ends donttjuslify means, strictly speaking; they are rather their very point and meaning. This is indicated in the ambiguity inthe French word sens, which signifies both direction or vector and meaning. Thus Sartre says ends are "the synthetic unity" of means, the unfolding of all the means. In a word, the end is the "totalization" of the means (except when it is interrupted, leaving a "de-totalized totality" which is nevertheless comprehended through the end it was aiming at).45 For Sartre, humanity is not something that can be preparedfor, e.g. by nationalizing factories; it is rather all the acts, starting now, of creating it. The end does not come after the means; it is rather the significance that permeatestheir deployment in history and holds them together as means. The means, in turn, by concretizing the end in a particular situation, come to incamate it in unintended as weil as intended ways. Thus ends don't justify acts; they are the parts of acts that make up their very intelligibilityas human doings rather than mere events or processes. Similarly with means: they are constituent parts or moments of acls. Being inseparable aspecls of a single movement that unifies itself as it goes along, means and ends cantt be weighed against each olber, as ODe might weigh, say, proposed alternative acts against each other with respect to their consequences. Revolution is a task, a complex of acts. If anything, both revolutioDary means and revolutionary ends should be together on the same side of the moral scale, to be weighed morally against action on the other side. On Sartre's analysis of means and ends, then, the initial question, which presumes 45CDR I, pp. 45-46. their moral separa~ility, is meaningless. It is made from an impossible suprahistorical perspective and misconstrues the structure of human action.
Toward the end of Chapter Four Sartre writes: "All means are good except those which denature the end." (164/139) In 1947 he wrote that means can be so incompatible with their end as to •smash " the syntheses they are supposed to help constitute. 46 This provides us with a criterion for revolutionaries. If we provisionallyaccept Sartre's replacement ofthe idea that means arejustified (or not) by their ends, with the idea that means "denature" (or exemplify) their ends, then two questions arise: (1) Does the end of revolutionary action harmonize with any and all means, or are 'there limits, are there means that do "de-natur~" or "smash" the "synthetic unities" or "totalizations" of which they are apart? And (2) ifthe revolutionary end is not compatible with certain means is this because a moral principle external to the revolutionary task itself supervenes for Sartre in order to guide good choices of means?
We can see that Sartre's answer to the first question is "yes," there are limits. We've just considered means that have a limited efficacity, but which, if allowed to dominate action, would undermine their end, and which therefore require consideration of that end if they are to be controlIed and Iimited. Another even more compelling example of what the socialist ethics rules out is supplied by Sartre's bitter denunciation in The Ghost 01Stalin of Soviet premier Khrushchev's invasion of Hungary with Soviet troops in 1956 to quell a workers' rebellion-a means that "smashes" the task of empowering workers.
It shows clearly how "the rule of efficacity" would exclude conduct by the revolutionary force that denatures or intemally upsets the end it aims at. 47 To the second question. however. Sartre's answer is a perhaps unexpected "no." Contrary to the liberal tradition in morals. Sartre argues that "praxis" supplies its own moral limits. There is no autonomous morality with apriori validity for praxis. Instead there iSt as bis tille implies. a "morality of praxis" itself (wbich has autonomy as a goal). No extra-historical moral principle is appealed to here.
As we have seen. the absence of an extemal standard does not mean all means are permitted. Sartre even goes to the point of saying "the revolutionary force" itself must be sacrificed if its perpetuation would denature the revolutionary goal of autonomous humanity. This opens up the risk that Sartre's standard. wbich is intemal to the revolutionary struggle against the system. could be used by defenders of the system against revolutionaries. Thus. if it is known in advance by the defenders of the existing system that its opponents will find certain measures morally unacceptable. then. to defeat revolutions. it will be enough to so escalate counter-revolutionary violence as to impose on the revolutionaries the choice of either abandoningthe struggle or engaging in these measures-since presumably they'll choose the former because they will shrink from tbe latter. We see no way to secure Sartre's criterion against the risk of such manipulation. Those using Sartre's own criterion would. however. be more able to respond in a liberatory manner than would tbose wbo brought an inflexible. extemal standard to bear on revolutionary praxis. The scale metaphor alluded to above. if intemalized by revolutionaries. could be used to stop revolution by a simple process of escalation of violence (by counterrevolutionaries unrestrained by tbese same scruples). Sartre's socialist morality is not tbus limited. and does not bave its own defeat buHt into itself. At the same time. there clearly bave been for Sartre circumstances in wbich it migbt be best to abandon a given revolutionary force altogether in order to re-group and start again elsewbere. 48 Yet Sartre's t~eatment of "socialist morality" (as briefly reviewed here) has the defects of its virtues. Its virtues are its willingness to specify the ends of revolution, its freedom from prejudice, and the sheer vastness of the domain of human affairs that it stakes out as morally pertinent. Yet four central aspects of this program are, in our judgement, plausible in principle yet incompletely explained and argued fore 1) We have omitted to focus here on Sartre's critique of capitalism, which is distributed throughout bis oeuvre and nowhere synthesized. Yet it is important for his explanation of revolutionary praxis. In general this critique focuses on the claim that capitalism's devotion to lethe thing," to property and profit over human ac~ion and human need, suppresses freedom. But socialism is itself also a system with all its practico-inert limits on freedom. How precisely would socialism facilitate humanity as the latter's "last means"? How should this socialism be constructed? This is not a demand for a presumptuous prediction or a guess at history's direction. But human development seems sufficiently advanced to allow descriptioD of capitalism as one choice or alternative possibility and socialism as another. Sartre bad planned to investigate how the capitalist system is "invented" by "persons" in the second volume of his Critique. 49 If it is invented by humans, can an alternative also be invented? And what is its shape, then, as alternative? Unfortunately, neither his critique of capitalism nor his account of socialism is ample enough for us to be able to answer these questions decisively. There is no theoretical inhibition in Sartre against doing so, but he just doesn't give answers.
2) And what precisely is "humanity"? This notion combines a variety of profound Sartrean themes: freedom; tbe pledged group; satisfaction of need; group autonomy and individual sovereignty; socialism and communism. But how exactly does it combine them? Is this goal worth fighting for? In particular, how might we distinguish, if at all , between Sartrean humanity and the older, enlightenment conception of humanity that contains "masculinist" prejudices, as some feminist tbeorists argue? To answer, a Sartrean would need a clear enough conception of humanity (and its relation to socialism as "last means") to be useful in deciding, for example, whether a given undertaking will lead to it or to its opposite. This area of mediations is usually that of politics. But this dimension is notoriously weak in Sartre's all-or-nothing world view, or rather, the political tends to be subsumed under the moral or the historical. One result is that there is only the most fragmentary positive theory of democracy in his work, once bis criticisms of electoral politics are over. This gap might disappear once capitalism is fully described, on the one hand, and a systematic account of humanity is given on the other.
3) How exactly does the "de-nature" criterion actually work in revolutionary practice? If we had a clear answer to this question we could also answer a related question where revolutionaries would want clarity: when terror by revolutionaries is and is not permitted. But Sartre is ambiguous on terror. What types of use of sub-humans to make humanity is he speaking of? Are there any permissible cases of terror that do not originate among the masses? May sub-humans outside the revolutionary group be used as means? Tbe entire section on terror moves at a level of abstraction that leaves such questions unanswered.
We might be able to answer the questions on terror if we had a clearer idea of which means "denature" ends. But there is a difficulty in Sartre's account here. Clearly it is not enough to say a given means alters the end. This is a dialectical truth of all action as such. All means alter the end by concretizing it, giving it an iocamatioo, as Sartre says. Someone who goes straight ahead without taking account of the way means alter ends, can therefore lose track of where he or she is going and wind up in an unintended place. It seems that ends guide the choices of means, but ODe cannot strictly deduce means from ends. But then when can we say an end is not merely altered by its means or concretized by it, but is "de-natured" by the means? And how, if at all, can we reasonably anticipale that a given means might de-nature the end it is meant to help us attain?
Sartre is not alone. The question of revolutionary violence has bedeviled the tradition of theorizing about revolution and needs re-thinking from the ground up. so There are resources outside The 1964 Rome Lecture for conslrucling existential answers to these questions,51 and the overall strength soA forthcoming book by Joseph Walsh promisca this. SI As pointed out above, Chapter 3 of Beauvoir'aThe Elhics 0/Ambigulty ia most uscful in this regard, and almost certainly had Sartre'. concurrence. Violent inaurgent acta are often treated in his many concrete essays on popular atroggle. in Algeria, Vietnam, Cuba, the Basque country and of Sartre's acco~t of the task of liberation argues for doing so. Meanwhile, though, the 1964 treatment offers only an evocative, ambiguous outIine. Perhaps for such reasons Sartre did not publish this work.
4) FinaUy, we find in the socialist ethics an uncharacteristically abstract, rootless quality. Which situation does the revolutionary praxis it describes respond to? Is he referring primarily to reform of Soviet-dominated regimes, to revolution in the centers of capitalism, or on its periphery-or to all three? Most of his examples are drawn from CDR 11 with its focus on Eastern Europe, yet he is clearly trying to develop a moral praxis of the revolutionary group that would be more generally applicable. This, above all, would require working out a syste~tic critique of capitalism. Morality antI History contains a lengthy section devoted to an immanent critique of capitalism, showing the impossibility of Iiving out its own most intimate structures, namely its dominant morality.
But, focussed as that work is on private Iife under capitalism, with its patriarchal structures, it is a valuable but only incomplete part of the systemic analysis-Iike the one he projected regarding the USSR-that would have been required to ground a broadly revolutionary praxis aimed at replacing capitalism. Such an analysis requires mastery of vast empirical detail on capitalism. Perhaps because "socialist ethics" hangs in the air for want of such grounding, and despite the richness added by Morality and History and CDR 11 (which .was itself dropped only two years earlier in the face of the vast research required to complete it), Sartre dropped it and never returned to finish it, going on to other projects. The revolutionary praxis it urges lacks situatedness as a result.
We believe a generous and comprehensive reading of Sartre and bis fellow existentialists would uncover resources for answering these questions, perhaps convincingly. But after studying the mid-60's writings on ethics we find ourselves left with them. off the fence and either go back to Heidegger or come forward to Marx. 52 But we believe Sartre is neither ambiguous on central issues nor un-Marxist. It is perhaps because regimes that supported such participants ignored Sartre's cautions against alienated moralities that the revolution of 1989 was inevitable. In any case, it seems to us Sartre's Marxism can still help in 1991 in thinking through revolutionary social change.
Sartre's existential "socialist morality" was bom under the brutal repressiveness of fascist occupation. Following the liberation, he and his comrades hoped that, using such a morality, France would move "From Resistance to Revolution"-the promethean masthead slogan of Albert Camus' daily newspaper Combat. It may seem that fascist-like defenses of the status quo no longer exist and hence tbat existential ethics is only an historical curiosity. But the rape and murder of nuos and priests who work with the poor in Central America does not significantly differ from the arbitrary murder of French citizens by Nazi troops, or the lynching of blacks in the U.S. South, which Simone de Beauvoir found in 1948 to be "an absolute evil. "S3 Such acts have a single message: obey; if you assert a need, or protest its denial, you will be treated likewise. The equivalent of fascist occupation surely exists, at least on the system's periphery where it is currently challenged. The "socialist morality" is therefore still pertinent. It would in any case be prudent to preserve, publish, and study these incomplete writings of Sartre's in order to have tools-in-waiting that can be picked up and completed for new purposes, as they are needed. 
